Oil & Gas Investment Bulletin’s 2013 LNG Investment Conference: Recap

0

I’m all about making money for subscribers.

I don’t spend a lot of time mulling over macro stuff. I want to know the macro basics and then research and discover which companies will profit.

There are a lot of guys MUCH smarter than me when it comes to figuring out where the Market is going, or even where one small industry is going.

And sticking to that thesis made my first-ever LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) Conference in Vancouver on Wednesday a huge success. Sponsorship by Wolverton Securities allowed me to bring in two Tier 1 experts explain Canada’s place in the LNG world to the 250 attendees (who gave up a rare sunny day in Vancouver to listen!).

And then the audience heard from seven small and mid-cap public companies that will benefit greatly from the $100 billion dollar infrastructure build that LNG should give western Canada. That’s how you make the money.

Here’s my take on the Key Points of the Day from the speakers, and some of the Key Points from the CEOs of the public companies.

I was the first speaker—but only for a few minutes. My main message was that the energy services companies—the drillers, the frackers, or pumpers as they’re called—and all the construction companies who do the dirty grunt work preparing drill sites and pipeline right of ways etc.—all these stocks had a good summer run and are now stalling, waiting for the next catalyst in the LNG game.

I told the crowd I think that’s happening in October, when Golar (GLNG-NASD) and the Haisla First Nation likely announce a Final Investment Decision (FID) on their 0.2 bcf/d export project in Kitimat. This will either be the first or second small scale LNG export facility in the world—this is brand new technology. I think that news could spur a lot of these stocks up.

Another catalyst—that’s much less clear on timing—is the first announcement of a long term gas contract from one of the larger groups, like Shell or Chevron.

Chris Theal from Kootenay Capital was the next speaker. Chris is a plain talker—you always know where you sit with him. I think that comes from his time in the Canadian military. He is a disciplined investor!

He dispelled the talk that Asia would be able to buy cheap LNG, based on North American natural gas pricing. LNG pricing must and will remain linked to the oil price—about 14-17% of Brent—if anybody is going to build new multi-billion dollar terminals.

Every minute investors worry about cheap LNG for Asia…well, you’re just never going to get that minute back.

His favourite way to invest in the LNG build out is through the services stocks. He likes the drillers with rigs that can drill the deep Duvernay formation in western Canada. And he sees a big pinch in fracking capacity in western Canada next year because of that—giving the frackers a lot of pricing power starting in Q2 2014. He is positioning his Kootenay Capital fund now for that run (www.kootenaycapital.com).

Chris said Canadian gas producers are “in the right basin” when it comes to sending gas to high-value Asian markets. He estimated that all-in costs to deliver gas from most areas of British Columbia should come in below $10/mcf. Very competitive with supply from the U.S. Gulf Coast, where shipping costs for transiting the Panama Canal make landed gas in Asia likely to cost well north of $10/mcf.

He believes that gas from the Montney and Duvernay plays are particularly attractive in terms of supplying cost-effective LNG—especially the Duvernay, where initial production rates from gas wells have been rising, while drilling costs continue to drop as producers learn the rock.

The Horn River play, he said, has trickier economics—but could still be competitive with other sources of gas globally.

Next up was Nathan Weiss, who flew in from Boston to speak to our retail audience. Nathan publishes a very expensive institutional research newsletter called Unit Economics, and only keeps 30 clients; we were VERY lucky he was able to fit us in his schedule.

He is one of the few original thinkers in the market, and one of the rare men who do true, primary research. He doesn’t synthesize what others tell him. He doesn’t need or even want to know what brokerage analysts are saying. He creates his own financial models from scratch, using original data points.

That allows him to get very granular in economic detail. And he did that for us—have a look at this slide on his estimated costs for BC LNG going to Asia. There were about 10 slides that got him to this:
LNG-investment-conference

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some other interesting tidbits from Nathan’s presentation: every 1 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of natural gas exported from western Canada should produce 15,000 direct and another 30,000 indirect jobs for the area. There are now proposals for 13 bcf/d. You do the math.

He did warn that the two LNG facilities in Oregon could eat Canada’s lunch—using Canadian gas but only generating upstream Canadian jobs, NOT the high-paying construction jobs for the export terminals themselves—if BC misses its timing window.

We heard from a stellar line-up of public company CEOs who outlined their investment merits to the audience. There was a good mix of presenters:

1. Canada’s two largest fluid services companies (drilling mud)—Secure Energy (SES-TSX) and Canadian Energy Services (CEU-TSX) ;

2. Two leading intermediate natural gas producers in western Canada—Painted Pony Exploration (PPY-TSX) and Bellatrix (BXE-NYSE/TSX)

3. Three construction support companies—Petrowest (PWR-TSXv), Entrec (ENT-TSXv) and Enterprise Group (E-TSX).

Oilfield Services: The Way to Play

Ian Hogg of construction and transport group Petrowest (PRW-TSX) told how one of his firm’s clients in the LNG business believes that costs for a single facility may end up as high as $80 billion.

Petrowest is the largest custom gravel-crushing company in western Canada, among their many services for construction of roads, drill pads, and other facilities. Most of the gas infrastructure that has to be built to supply Canadian LNG is going to be in very remote parts of British Columbia and Alberta. Quick and affordable construction is a must for operators. He showed a slide of all the LNG proposals on the board now and he said they were ALL customers of his.

Des O’Kell of Enterprise Group (E-TSX) had a great video of how their proprietary technology pre-heats new pipelines in the north. I had no idea how important this was. The oil out of the ground is hot and can cause the pipe to crack and leak. Between that division and their tunneling division, they are positioned to be one of the top beneficiaries of LNG development.

Other services groups are trying to anticipate niche industrial needs for LNG developers. Entrec (ENT-TSXv) CFO Jason Vandenberg described how his firm recently purchased the largest crane operator in western Canada. Cranes have the best profit margins I see in the LNG construction game.

Most LNG facilities will be built as modular components, requiring big cranes for construction, shipping, and reassembly at site, not to mention ongoing maintenance. Vandenberg noted that Entrec’s crane operations have been servicing LNG heartland Kitimat for decades—giving the firm a big leg up on would-be competitors here.

Then of course, there’s the actual drilling that’s going be needed to get gas out of the ground. Craig Nieboer, CFO of Canadian Energy Services (CEU-TSX), pointed out that none of the gas projects in the Montney or Horn River plays are yet in “harvest mode.” Producers have been sizing up the plays with exploration drilling—assessing design and spacing of wells to optimally exploit these fields.

As things ramp up toward LNG output, gas companies will need to convert thousands of well locations from conceptual reserves to actual production through the drill bit. Canadian Energy is helping them do that cheaper by designing specialty chemical solutions for drilling muds. This is a space where a 10% increase in drilling efficiency can create hundreds of millions of dollars in savings on a big drilling program. And producers are willing to pay top dollar to services firms like CEU that can deliver those efficiencies.

Secure Energy Services (SES-TSX) VP Nick Wieler also noted that services needs in BC will extend beyond drilling. Secure is looking to help gas producers with waste processing and disposal from drill sites and production facilities. Secure has a big lesson for investors: Their business is not sexy, but this is one of the highest-margin segments of the services business—they have the highest corporate profit margins of any company I know of in the energy services sector.

And like Nieboer’s CEU, their stock is never cheap. But if you let that bother you, you would have missed out on a $3-$15 run in the last three years.

Secure is building out its facilities in northeast British Columbia to be ready when hundreds of wells start spudding en masse.

BC Gas: Great With LNG, Good Without It

The conference’s two presenting E&Ps—Painted Pony Petroleum (PPY-TSXv) and Bellatrix Exploration (BXE-TSX)—were quick to point out that LNG would be icing on the cake for BC gas producers. But by no means a necessity.

Bellatrix CEO Ray Smith’s outlined what has turned his company into a very low cost producer. With over 400 barrels per day of liquids coming out of BXE’s wells in the Notikewin (also known as the Spirit River Formation), gas is almost an after-thought to economics.

Ray is a fantastic public speaker—one of the best I’ve ever seen. He is worth driving to see. One of the attendees quipped that the trading symbol for Bellatrix should be R-A-Y. He explained very clearly that if LNG goes ahead, natural gas prices are going higher and as a low cost producer, his shareholders have the most leverage.

Painted Pony President and CEO Pat Ward has the simplest story—he has massive reserves of natural gas located in B.C., which is what the big LNG companies want. Their ground is right beside Progress Energy, which Malaysia’s Petronas bought for $6 billion. If someone bought Painted Pony on the same metrics, their stock would be over $20. It now trades for $8. And BG Group is openly on the hunt for gas supply.

They are hitting some amazing wells—in the Montney they have hit up to 24.5 million cubic feet per day. The company’s results here to date have set up an incredible drilling inventory of 290 horizontal locations. There’s going to be lots to exploit if and when LNG developers come looking for supply.

Should Investors Bet on Big or Small LNG?

The day ended with a speak-off between our resident analysts, Chris Theal and Nathan Weiss, on the scale in LNG development. Chris is a believer that large mega-projects will win the day, while Nathan’ analysis shows that smaller-scale, floating developments may actually deliver competitive operating costs… at much lower initial capital expenditure.

It’s a very germane debate, as the first LNG export facility in western Canada will be the small scale Golar one. All the other proposals are 20x the size of it. Twenty.

Weiss believes that capacity to gasify and ship BC gas will cost about $30/mcf for a large-scale project. Given all-in operating costs of around $10/mcf—and at current Asian LNG pricing of roughly $15/mcf—that yields a margin of $5/mcf, and a six-year payback on investment.

While not a bad investment proposition, Nathan notes that small-scale projects may deliver similar margins at an installed cost of about $15/mcf. Not only does that drop the payback period to three-ish years, but Nathan thinks it will also speed time to production. He estimates that small-scale projects could take as little as two years to go from investment decision to output—whereas large-scale projects could take as many as five years to build.

Chris pointed out though, that fixed costs might be a killer for small-scale projects. Small projects still need a lot of big infrastructure. And they’ll have to complete with larger projects for labor—driving up costs for this key input.

Moreover, Chris noted that cost of capital is likely to be higher for small, less-established developers. He recalled his investment banking experience with a micro-cap group trying to shop Canadian LNG contracts to Asian buyers—noting that getting taken seriously as a tiny company is almost impossible in this space.

Both speakers agreed that permitting and regulatory concerns are one of the biggest risks to LNG projects large or small in BC. More certainty is needed on issues like taxes and the development of needed pipeline infrastructure.

But there was no dispute that the stepping stones for LNG are being laid in western Canada. That means that billions will be spent—even if no projects ultimately get built.

A great thanks to Wolverton Securities, one of the most venerable securities firms in western Canada, for sponsoring a great day.

 

Illinois Basin’s New Albany Shale: The Next Big U.S. Horizontal Oil Play?

0

If you were on the hunt for the next big horizontal oil play in the U.S., where would you be inclined to look?

Texas?  That makes sense; Texas is the top oil producing state in the country.

California?  That also makes sense, California has been a top oil producing state for decades.

But Illinois?  Well, would you believe it has produced 4 billion barrels already, and 4 Tcf (that would be Trillion cubic feet) of natural gas?

It’s true.  And now, there are rumblings of something very significant happening again in the Illinois oil patch–rumblings of a big horizontal oil play.

Companies in the region are keeping their cards close to their vest, but there is enough information in the public domain to know that some oil companies think the Illinois Basin’s New Albany Shale could hold a sizable shale prize.  In fact, I’m very surprised we haven’t heard a lot more about this basin yet.

History of the Illinois Basin — It’s Right Under the Industry’s Nose

illinois basin
The Illinois Basin is an oval depression that’s roughly 60,000 miles in the United States Mid-Continent—southern Illinois, southwest Indiana and northwest Kentucky.

Drilling in the Illinois Basin goes back to 1853—and like many things, it was discovered accidentally; by drilling that was being done in a search for saltwater. (Early settlers needed saltwater for preserving food and agriculture.)

But it wasn’t until the early 1900s that the first Illinois basin oil boom truly occurred when well casings were used to manage all the water. (Most retail investors have no idea how much water the oil industry produces—it’shuge.)

In the 1930s a second boom started when seismic technology became available and helped to pinpoint oil pools.

This made oil a lot easier to find, and this oil boom lasted through the 1940s and 1950s. Production peaked in 1940 at 147.6 million barrels.

After World War II, production rates fell because all of the easy targets had been drilled.  During the boom the Illinois basin was the third largest producing oil basin in the United States.

Since then production has declined with no new oil targets to drill.

That historical production of 4 billion barrels of oil and 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas was all done with vertical wells in old-style, “conventional” oil pools; not today’s shale or “unconventional” plays.

All that oil had to come from somewhere. Underneath all those conventional oil pools is the New Albany Shale—and oil and source rock analysis indicates that’s where the oil came from.  Given the success of all these other shale plays in the US under very similar geology, those source rocks could provide a re-birth for oil production in a region that has been in decline for more than half a century.

The New Albany Shale Looks Just Like The Bakken

The New Albany Shale is Devonian age and was formed roughly 350 million years ago in a shallow sea that once covered the eastern half of the United States.

Eastern Northern America Paleography

The New Albany Shale was formed at the same time as four other major U.S. oil resource plays that include:

  • The Williston Basin / Bakken Shale
  • The Anadarko Basin / Woodford Shale
  • The Appalachian Basin / Marcellus Shale
  • The Michigan Basin / Antrim Shale

So it was deposited at the same time as some of the most prolific source rocks in North America—that’s certainly a great pedigree!  If the other source rocks have borne major horizontal resource plays why wouldn’t the New Albany Shale?

A 2002 study estimated that the New Albany Shale was deep enough to have generated up to 300 billion barrels of oil—that’s what the industry calls OOIP—Original Oil In Place.

With that much oil in place, the New Albany shale has the potential to be another big—very big—horizontal oil play–even if only a small percentage can be recovered.
.

strategic

 

That conventional production has come from 140,000 wells that were drilled into the Illinois Basin.  32,000 of those wells are still producing!  The drilling and production from these wells have allowed oil companies sniffing around the New Albany Shale to gather a lot of evidence.  The industry calls that “well control.”

What these companies and their geologists have found has been encouraging as it has led them to conclude that the best analog for the New Albany Shale appears to be the Elm Coulee Bakken of Montana—which has produced 123 million barrels of oil from horizontal wells so far.

The New Albany and Elm Coulee are similar in age, porosity and size.  No two shale plays are exactly alike, but there is good reason to believe that a short learning curve with horizontal wells could move the New Albany Shale from being a potential shale oil play to the real deal.

How The Play Gets Proved Up

old hz bakken shale play

The New Albany Shale is developing the same as the Bakken, Eagle Ford and other horizontal plays.

First you find a basin that has produced a lot of oil already.  Step two: identify the source rock that still contains huge quantities of oil; usually a bit deeper.  Step three then is to “crack the geological nut” and figure out how to get enough of that huge amount of oil left in those source rocks out at profitable rates—that requires fracking.

Step one and step two are already complete for the New Albany Shale.  How close we are to step three is hard to tell.

The companies operating in the region have drilled a few wells, but the results have been kept very quiet to date.

Companies don’t promote bad results, and good results are kept even quieter since letting that information would immediately drive acreage prices through the roof.

What we know for sure is that the oil is in the ground in the New Albany Shale.  Decades of conventional production tells us that.

What we also know is that enormous tracts of land have been leased over the past couple of years in the basin and we know that prices per acre have already at least quintupled over that time.

Someone wants to lock down that land.

Horizontal drilling combined with multi-stage fracturing may again be the miracle that releases the oil trapped in the New Albany Shale.

The potential of this play is exciting, and still quite early stage.  And I just found the one junior explorer that has some incredible leverage to this new play. 

Stand by for the details in my next article.

by +Keith Schaefer

Payout Times: My #1 Factor in Valuing Junior Oil Stocks

0

In early 2013 the junior energy market turned on a dime—it went from rewarding growth, to rewarding sustainability—companies that grow within cash flow.

Few companies can do this—and the smaller you are, the more difficult it is. But one of the smallest doing this successfully is Brian Schmidt’s Tamarack Valley Energy (TSX Venture: TVE).

What’s the secret? Wells that payout fast—within a year; 16 months at the outside.

I’ve said before—this is the #1 factor I look at in junior producers. How fast do the wells pay out?

Juniors need that fast payout to recycle that cash back into the next well. Few Canadian teams can grow production and not grow their debt.

“Year long payouts aren’t really common,” Schmidt told me in an interview recently. “You can’t do that coming in late to a play; well, you can get 1 year payout on half cycle economics, which doesn’t include land costs, but we look at everything on full cycle basis.”

“We have got our debt to cash flow from 3:1 down to 1.6:1, all through the drill bit. Before our merger with Sure Energy, we would have taken production up from 2160 boe/d (barrels of oil equivalent) in 2012 to 3000 in 2013, and cash flow from $17 million a year to $30 million a year with no new equity.

“We had to get our payout down to about a year. You can’t do 18-month payouts and grow. The guys worked hard to cut our Cardium costs by $1 million a well and our Viking Redwater play costs were reduced by $300,000 per well.”

Pre-merger, Tamarack is producing 2,890 boe/d (barrels of oil equivalent) and 41% of that is natural gas, and 59% oil and Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs). They have been steadily increasing their oil production, which is making them more profitable.

Schmidt says a lot of factors go into getting 12-month paybacks:

1. Getting in early on a play, and not overpaying for land—they paid $5.3 million for their 13 Cardium sections, and soon after other producers were paying $4 million for just one section.

2. Doing a lot of the little technical things right, like picking the right drilling mud and bits, using water vs. oil for their frack fluid, and monobore drilling (you don’t have to stop drilling to put in casing; a 2-day savings). Constant tweaking of drilling and fracking, and cost discipline are key—which is becoming more rare, Schmidt says.

“I think this industry in the junior sector lost some of its value discipline. The old strategy was to raise a bit of money, drill some wells and get some PUDs (Proven Undeveloped drill locations) and sell.

“The rate of return wasn’t the economics of the wells themselves, it was the disposition value. But now the royalty trusts are gone and intermediates aren’t paying premiums for juniors. The only way to create value is through the full cycle rate of return.

“And without equity coming in, full cycle rate of return becomes transparent to the market. How many companies have crashed and burned? In the last 6 months, there are 4 or 5 and the whole junior sector is being painted with that.”

And that paint brush is all about punishing companies who spend more capital and/or paying dividends than they produce in cash flow.

Schmidt suggests it will cost him $28-$30 million to keep production flat (the industry calls that sustaining capex) at 3000 bopd, increase TVE’s liquids weighting (oil and NGLs) to 60-65%, keep debt flat and get free cash flow be $4-$6 million using an $80per barrel Edmonton Par pricing. (It’s now $10 over that)

Despite that, TVE trades a big discount to its peer group—3.5x cash flow vs. peer average of 4.9x cash flow.

“I get two negatives from The Street,” says Schmidt, “size and liquidity. Liquidity (if a stock trades a lot of daily volume it’s called liquid; if it doesn’t it’s called thin–KS) is getting better.”

So Schmidt went out and did two deals that looked after those concerns. Announced on the same day, he took over Sure Energy for 6.3 million shares and assuming $32 million debt, AND he did a deal to earn 70% Working Interest into a 113 net section Cardium play. Sure did a $25 million financing at the same time, which means Tamarack issued another 10.1 million shares at $2.47. That makes for roughly 47 million shares out in total.

Post merger, Schmidt will be producing 3,828 boe/d, of which 56% are oil/liquids (and therefore 44% natural gas) with an operating netback of just under $36/barrel with 365 low risk drill locations in inventory. Schmidt says his payout performance will improve after these deals, as Sure Energy’s Redwater play is on Crown land, with lower royalties than demanded by Tamarack’s freehold lands.

Tamarack has two core plays that are allowing the company to self-fund growth.

Play #1 – Lochend/Garrington Cardium

Each Cardium well is costing Tamarack Valley roughly $2.8 to $3.4 million. These are expensive wells for a small company, but through strong production and cost-effective execution, Tamarack Valley is making this play work very profitably.

The payout period for Tamarack’s Cardium wells is 8-14 months. This is the kind of short payback that a junior producer needs so that cash can be quickly reinvested in the next well to keep growing production.

Tamarack has drilled some of the best wells in the basin compared to their Cardium peer group.

Tamarack is also getting those wells on production quickly—50 days on average. Junior producers often don’t control all of the infrastructure they need. For example after a well is drilled a junior producer may need to tie into a third party gas processing plant. This can lead to delays in connecting wells since the third party is going to look after its own interests first.

Play #2 – Redwater Viking

Tamarack’s second core play is the Viking in Redwater. This play is ideal for a junior producer.

Each Viking well costs only $1 million and has a payout period of 9-12 months—they’re shallow, so less time and money to drill.

These aren’t sexy wells that have booming initial production rates of 1,000 barrels per day like other resource plays in North America. But these low cost wells have great economics for a junior.

In both the Cardium and Viking, Tamarack has reduced the cost of bringing a well onto production. Cardium well costs are down 25% in three years to under $3 million. Viking well costs are down 30% to just over $1 million.

Bringing those well costs down greatly shortens the payout period of a well and improves the well profitability.

Valuation

It isn’t hard to find junior oil and gas companies that appear inexpensive in the current market environment. Many of these companies are cheap for a reason, though because they simply can’t grow without issuing equity and many are overlevered—too much debt.

Pre-merger, Schmidt was proving to the market he was one of the few who could grow production inside cash flow AND improve the balance sheet. Now his challenge is to bring his cost down further by expanding the playing field—both on his farm-in, where he’s paying 100% to earn 70% and the much larger Viking inventory.

His goal is to keep debt to cash flow steady at 1.7x or less as he increases production to 4,250 boepd at YearEnd (YE) 2013 to 5,350 boepd at YE 2014. So debt will grow, but at a lower rate than cash flow. He’s basing all that math on oil at $83/barrel.

Tamarack’s post-merger valuation—with net debt of an estimated $71 million and 3828 boepd production, is 4.8x EV/EBITDA, but only 3.5x 2014 cash flow based on $81 oil. Both these numbers are below peer averages, as is their $51,725 per flowing barrel.

by +Keith Schaefer

Editor’s Note: As today’s story highlighted, fast payouts are the biggest key to junior producers’ success. And there’s nothing that helps today’s shale producers get fast payouts BETTER than my # 1 portfolio pick. This is a company with, arguably, the single best product for improving production in ALL of the world’s shale formations. In fact they’ve doubled their U.S. market share — all organically — in the last 2 years. And it’s given my subscribers the opportunity to profit greatly… 2 ways. Learn more on my # 1 money-making opportunity here.

Why “Small Scale LNG” Makes Great Sense for Canada

0
Dear OGIB Reader,Small scale LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) exports from Canada’s west coast could replace the mega-projects now being considered by major oil companies.This would speed up exports, and create more jobs per billion cubic feet of gas (bcf) exported says Nathan Weiss, CEO of Unit Economics, an independent research firm in Boston.

“I think the solution that will get put in place in BC will be the smaller scale, barge-based solution. I wouldn’t be shocked if all the other facilities get strung out and we just have these barges popping up and it becomes the preferred solution.”

“It would make much more sense to build several smaller facilities that can still total 2 or 3 BCF of exports a day, rather than building 2 or 3 or 4 BCF a day mega-facilities like everybody is excited about,” Weiss says.

Weiss has studied global LNG for more than ten years, advising his institutional clients how to profit from the fast growing industry.

He will be speaking at my LNG Investment Conference in Vancouver B.C. on September 25th.  The conference is open to the public, and meant for retail investors to better understand how Canada’s LNG export industry will develop.  You can register at www.ogiblngconference.com.

Weiss suggests that the majors are seeing a strong potential for large scale LNG exports to cause a huge run up in western Canadian gas prices, removing most of the profit for the multi-billion dollar export plants.

“You’re in a region of BC that produces just over 3 BCF a day and a country that produces something like 13.7 BCF a day. Now you’re looking to build a potentially 4 BCF a day facility—a single facility that could be over 20% of the  country’s natural gas production.

“Most of the proposed facilities are massive compared to the potential available gas. There is actually a lot of commodity price risk if you open a large facility.”

He said the majors would rather build large scale LNG facilities in the Gulf of Mexico where they don’t have to worry about impacting local gas supplies and prices—that’s one of the reasons they’re dragging their feet in B.C.

Weiss says almost all the major oil companies have gone to the consortium model—with 2-3 partners. He says majors aren’t building large LNG facilities on their own anymore, given the cost overruns in Australia.

Big projects could cause natural gas price spikes in B.C. But smaller projects don’t interest the majors—“If you’re only doing a 1 or 2 BCF per day facility, it’s not interesting to them at that size—that kind of leaves them stuck in the middle.”
This leads Weiss to believe that the majors may not build any LNG terminals in Canada at the end of the day. However, if several small scale projects get built—and they don’t require the lengthy environmental review—that could still mean 10% of Canada’s natural gas production being exported within just a few years from now.
With western Canadian gas prices now trading at record discounts to US prices, it’s hard for investors to hear that LNG exports would cause such a price spike to make it uneconomic.“It is but then a relatively small facility like the (Douglas Channel) Golar (GLNG-NASD) facility could ultimately be 4 million tons a year or .5 BCF a day. That starts to impact supply and demand.”And Weiss says that several of the major LNG shipping companies—Norway based Hoegh LNG and Belgium-based Exmar—are looking at potential small scale LNG plans for British Columbia, so he believes there is potential for a rapid rise in western Canadian gas prices sooner than expected.

And when you talk of just one facility being 20% of all Canadian production, and with 2-4 facilities that size now in process, a natural gas price spike doesn’t sound so far-fetched.

“That just creates too much concern for them (the majors),” says Weiss.  In a worst case scenario, he says “you can end up with what we have in the US where we have now 16 BCF a day of LNG import facilities and we import about .6 BCF a day. You can have the same problem in reverse.”

Weiss adds that his research shows the smaller scale LNG projects would actually create more ongoing jobs than the mega-projects for British Columbia.

As a general rule, he suggests each BCF of LNG exports will create 15,000 direct jobs—40% in construction, 20% extracting the gas (mostly Alberta jobs) and the rest in pipelines and gas distribution.  Give that a multiplier of 3 for the general economy, when the workers spend their paychecks on groceries, housing, entertainment and more, and the economy can quickly generate 45,000 jobs per BCF/d of natural gas production.

The smaller scale LNG projects will cost roughly half of a big facility, but for ongoing jobs after the facilities are actually built, he says smaller scale projects are more labour intensive.

“It’s actually more jobs per million tons a year production—i.e., if you build a massive 10 million ton a year facility (7.5 million tons per year, or mtpa=1 bcf per day) some of those will only have 200 or 300 people working; whereas, if you build a 1 million ton a year facility you might have 30 or 40 people.”

Although there may be fewer construction jobs created with small scale LNG, getting several projects into production years ahead of the big facilities will create thousands of spin off jobs that much faster, making up the difference.Concludes Weiss: “The ultimate trump card for small scale LNG is that roughly 50 to 70% of your costs actually go onto the barge.  So if the project goes awry, you can pick up 50 to 70% of your costs and move them somewhere else.”  As a result, “Small scale LNG just makes so much sense for B.C.”Weiss will be one of two keynote speakers at the OGIB LNG Investment Conference being held at the Pan Pacific Hotel in Vancouver B.C. on Wednesday, September 25.  He will also be available for questions on a panel at the end of the day.

Natural gas producers and service companies listed on the TSX will present their investment merits to investors.  Investors can meet with these senior management teams directly during breaks.

SEATING IS LIMITED.  Registration is $49 and includes two-month free membership to my premium stock picking service.  Register today at www.ogiblngconference.com

by +Keith Schaefer

P.S.  A major new catalyst was just announced—this morning—for my my # 1 natural gas stock, and it now has the stock trading near its 52-week high.  What’s the catalyst?  A highly accretive Joint Venture that’s going to create an unbelievable amount of money for my natural gas pick.  What’s more—a second big catalyst is coming up in less than 2 weeks—on September 15. That’s why I’ve put together my full research on the play…I explain everything you’ll need to know to capitalize well in advance, here in this brief presentation. That’s everything from how the company’s payouts on production are some of the fastest I’ve seen (even at these low natural gas prices)…to what this “fast growth phenomenon” could mean for the stock. Get the full development here.

What Investors Should Know about Today’s New LNG Deals

0

When the First Nations Group Limited Partnership (FNLP) signed its benefits agreement with the B.C. government and backers of the Kitimat LNG project for a proposed 463-kilometre pipeline earlier this year, Robert Metcs was in the background, smiling.

Metcs, the President of Havlik Metcs Limited, which represented the 15 First Nations in the FNLP, says the $200 million agreement is a new benchmark for how business can be done between government, industry and aboriginal peoples in Canada.

The proposed pipeline will carry liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Summit Lake north of Prince George to the proposed Kitimat LNG facility, as well as provide a number of economic opportunities for First Nation communities along the route.

Metcs said his job was to “go out and get the best deal we could,” for the First Nations with Kitimat LNG project backers Apache Canada and Chevron Canada.

The Oil & Gas Investments Bulletin (OGIB) spoke with Metcs recently about negotiating with First Nations communities, and what investors should know about why some deals work out, while others don’t.

OGIB: How does the process start when a company comes to a First Nation community? What’s the right and wrong way to start a negotiation?

Robert Metcs: Traditionally, proponents would develop a project to a certain point and their lawyers would advise that there is a duty to consult with First Nations. That can work two ways. Most of the time what you are going to get on the other side of the table is a process that might lead to an impact benefit agreement, where there are some benefits through contracting opportunities, jobs and/or some form of payment over time. There is no real partnership. Or, you could have outright opposition and a pathway to litigation. That is where Northern Gateway looks to be now. It has become a symbol of how not to do consultation. I think that there is a widespread view out there that the traditional way of doing things is not serving anybody’s interests.

OGIB: What are some good examples of negotiations with First Nations?

Metcs: A good example is the Haisla First Nation with their BC LNG project with Houston-based LNG Partners LLC. That company went to talk to the Haisla before they even started planning the project for a floating LNG facility, asking if they wanted to be partners. We are trying to do something similar with the LNG-related pipeline proposals, which is to go to the proponents and say that there is the opportunity for first Nations to be partners, that there is value to be created and that this is economically advantageous to you as a proponent and as a business person to have the First Nation on board. Let’s sit down and figure out what this value is and how to make this work. There is a commercial benefit to getting First Nations on board as partners, and we are going to continue to try to explore that angle. What we have seen with LNG and natural gas is that many First Nations are willing to sit down and have this discussion within the context of a cost-benefit analysis. That does not appear to be the case with any of the oil pipelines.

OGIB: Why are the First Nations in your group in favour of natural gas pipelines, but not oil?

Metcs: I don’t think that’s an irrational position. One of the reasons we could do this deal was because the FNLP First Nations came to view natural gas as different from oil. The fear at first was that if they said yes to natural gas pipelines, they would have to say yes to oil pipelines. There was a diametrically opposed view with respect to natural gas and oil within FNLP. There are differences in terms of what happens if a pipeline leaks or bursts. Oil is a different animal, particularly along the BC coast and in the Interior. The cost benefit analysis appears to be in favour of natural gas and goes the other way in terms of oil. It’s not the pipeline; it’s what’s in the pipe. What goes in them is a consideration.

OGIB: What are some of the misconceptions you think investors have about companies working with First Nations?

Metcs: That they are always opposed to everything. That you can’t do business with them. That they don’t live up to agreements. This is partly the media’s fault. FNLP was a pretty unique deal. 15 First Nations said yes to a massive pipeline project, but the only question I seem to get is “What about oil?” You can talk about oil, but FNLP is an example of something that most people thought was impossible. Why it happened and whether it can be replicated are legitimate questions that should be asked.

OGIB: Help investors understand the cost-benefit analysis and why it worked out for the FNLP?

Metcs: The potential impacts of a project on rights and title and the environment are always going to be front and centre. You should be minimizing the impacts, which means doing things like rerouting from areas that are sensitive and respecting the legitimate concerns that First Nations will have. At the same time you should be trying to maximize things on a commercial basis. It’s not about proponents taking money out of their pockets and saying ‘How much of the pie are we going to give you?’ One thing we learned from the FNLP deal was that you can create value by having First Nations as partners as this can reduce project risk, accelerate timelines, all of the things you can put a number on. That’s real economic value that can be shared, so there’s an upside for everybody to do this. You also have to remember that each First Nation is its own government with its own constituents. There’s politics involved. The communities eventually need to make a decision, weigh the potential benefits against the potential impacts. The more attractive you can make that decision, the better. With FNLP, we got 15 Nations across the finish line. You aren’t going to get a positive decision every time, but that’s not irrational either.

OGIB: Is the FNLP agreement solid? Do investors have anything to worry about in terms of it falling apart down the road given this is all still a proposal?

Metcs: The only thing I can say is that, as in any agreement, we tried to align the interests of the parties going forward. With any agreement you can have circumstances change. There may be issues going forward, but I don’t think there is any more danger of this agreement falling apart than there would be with any other agreement.

OGIB: What’s next in terms of negotiations with First Nations and companies looking at natural gas and LNG projects in BC?

Metcs: We are involved in the other LNG pipeline proposals on behalf of a number of First Nations. The idea is to try to make it as broad as possible, but obviously other people are looking to do other things. I think we have a pretty good model and a pretty good group.

OGIB: What advice do you have for companies negotiating with First Nations?

Metcs: Get rid of the lawyers – the people advising them from a legal perspective – and look at it from a business perspective first. Look at it as a potential value creation proposition. And do it as early as you can. The most you have to lose is the First Nations say they’re not interested and you go back to the standard way of doing it. Look at the LNG project the Haisla are doing. It’s a small project, but they are going to be the first to export LNG from Canada and there’s a reason. It may not work in every situation. Some Nations aren’t as business-oriented as others. There is not a lot to lose. If you win, you win big and if you lose you go back to what you were going to do anyway.

OGIB: What are next steps in LNG for FNLP?

Metcs: The first step will be whether Chevron and Apache make a final investment decision to move forward with Kitimat LNG and PTP. FNLP has been restructured to implement the deal that was reached, so it is ready. As was announced recently, the Hon. Bob Rae has agreed to serve as Chairman on the Board of the general partner to ensure that all parties understand the importance of successfully implementing this deal. Many deals with First Nations have floundered because industry and governments have forgotten that signing an agreement is just the beginning. A long-term relationship has been established. As with any such relationship, it needs to be maintained.

OGIB: There are lots of proposals for LNG now in BC. Is your deal now the template or do you see different types of agreements with different First Nations?

Metcs: Every deal is different, but there are many aspects of the FNLP deal that could be adopted to other deals involving First Nations. It has certainly raised the bar in terms of what is possible for First Nations with respect to agreements with industry. It has also shown that First Nations and industry can deal directly with each other in trying to come to a fair trade, without having their interaction take place within a government-mandated consultation process.

OGIB: From a First Nation perspective, what does the LNG industry look like ten years from now in BC?

Metcs: I’m not sure that there can be any useful answer to that. Less than a decade ago, the idea that Canada would be looking to export, rather than import, LNG would have been dismissed out of hand by many of the same industry experts who are now making statements about future developments. “I don’t know” is the most honest answer that comes to mind.

by +Keith Schaefer– Keith

LNG Permitting Process: The Key Steps to Investment Profits

0

Three factors have the big LNG export proposals for Canada’s west coast racing ahead at only a snail’s pace:

1. Permits
2. Taxes
3. Offtake deals

In this article I want to talk about permitting—but before that, remember that the first LNG proposal that will export BC and Alberta gas—the Douglas Channel project with Golar (GLNG-NASD) – is so small at 0.2 bcf/d that it doesn’t need all this permitting.

Very small projects like that don’t need the big permits, just some small ones. This article is about the big LNG proposals, like Shell and Chevron and Petronas.

So with that in mind…what is the permitting process for a proposed liquefied natural gas export facility? What are the biggest challenges?

Step One: The National Energy Board (NEB)

The first hurdle – an export license from the federal National Energy Board – tests whether the project is in Canada’s economic best interests.

LNG proponents apply to the NEB to ship certain volumes of LNG annually for a set number of years. To grant an export license the board must find that the proposal is in the public interest and that the energy commodity to be exported is surplus to Canada’s energy needs.

Here the “best interest” question is only economic – the NEB is not charged with considering environmental impacts. Since the province – nay, the continent – is overflowing with natural gas and its export should generate all kinds of jobs and tax revenues, it’s little surprise that the board has approved every single LNG export license so far.

Three projects – Douglas Channel, Kitimat LNG, and LNG Canada – have already obtained NEB authorization. Three other applications are under review.

Step Two: Environmental Approval

The environmental assessment (EA) process is the longest and most complicated permitting step – and it carries the least certainty. To earn a green light projects have to meet the goals of environmental, economic, and social sustainability.

To that end, the EA process examines each project for anything that could be environmentally, economically or socially bad, and what heritage and health effects that may occur over the project’s entire life cycle.

That means talking to A LOT of people…

1. Consulting with First Nations,

2. Completing in-depth technical studies on potential significant adverse effects,

3. Designing strategies to prevent or reduce those adverse effects, and then putting all the input and findings into a huge report that carries a recommendation to the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Natural Gas on whether the project should be allowed – or not.

There’s a “Pre-Application Phase,” where the Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) decides if the project does indeed need EA approval and, if it does, how the approval process should work.

There is a lot of back-and-forth between the government and the company submitting the proposal—more technical data, engineering, proof of consultation, etc.

Once the full “Application Review Phase” starts, the EAO has 180 days to complete its review. That period includes a 45- to 60-day public comment period that includes open houses.

The EAO writes up a draft report that it shares with the proponent, the working group, and with First Nations, adding in any input. The final report includes a recommendation from the executive director of the EAO on whether an EA certificate should be issued and a draft EA certificate.

The draft certificate lists commitments the proponent made during the EA process to address concerns. It is not uncommon for an EA certificate to have more than 100 commitments – which are all legally binding if the certificate is signed.

It then goes to the government and the ministers have 45 days to make a decision. They can issue the EA certificate with the commitments listed, refuse to issue a certificate, or require further study.

Things have gotten easier on the EA front in recent years. In its recent budget the federal government handed almost all control of the EA process for energy projects to the provinces—before, they both did one. Sigh.

It’s a good move, but pipelines are still considered separate projects from the LNG facilities themselves, so that’s another entire EA approval process.

The First Nations Question

First Nations support is vital. Earning support for a LNG facility might not be too hard. Pipelines are a different story – and every facility needs one.

Anyone who wants to build a pipeline across northern BC likely has to consult with at least half a dozen First Nations, each with a different set of expectations and demands.

If you can find common ground, deals between project proponents and affected First Nations take the form of Impacts and Benefit Agreements. There are lots of examples – but the biggest challenge is that there still is no clear definition of what constitutes sufficient consultation, mitigation, and benefits. A poorly defined end game, to say the least.

Sometimes the road is smoother. The Haisla First Nation that occupies territory near Kitimat and at the head of the Douglas Channel is involved in three LNG proposals.

The Haisla are viewing this as an opportunity: they believe the deals that will flow from these LNG projects could give their people the ability to simply buy the lands they believe are theirs, without a treaty (and negotiations have been going on for years, if not decades).

More Permits

After this, work cannot start on the liquefaction plant until the project earns a facility permit from the BC Oil and Gas Commission. Then there are five different Acts that a facility must comply with—after the big EA approval has been won.

The process isn’t any more arduous than in other places, though it is a new ballgame with rules being made up on the fly. But BC offers advantages to would-be LNG exporters over other locales.

1. The transport route from BC to Asia is only 9-10 days vs. 20-plus days for LNG ships out of the Gulf of Mexico.

2. LNG is 30% more efficient in the cold weather of northwest BC vs. tropical areas.

3. Canadian gas fields have liquids like ethane and butane, which add value by increasing the fuel’s energy density. A lot of US LNG has to add this in.

That’s great for would-be exporters…but on the flip side, the flood of interest raises some big picture questions for British Columbians and for the regulators charged with developing this brand new industry.

How many natural gas pipelines should be built across northern BC?

Is a fleet of independent facilities the best approach, or should proponents be required to rationalize some of their infrastructure?

How should the operations be powered? How much should they be taxed?

We are going to find out all these answers in the next two years.

by +Keith Schaefer

Canada’s LNG Export Facilities: Hurdles and Challenges

0

Three factors have the big LNG export proposals for Canada’s west coast racing ahead at only a snail’s pace:

1. Permits

2. Taxes

3. Offtake deals

In this article I want to talk about permitting—but before that, remember that the first LNG proposal that will export BC and Alberta gas—the Douglas Channel project with Golar (GLNG-NASD) – is so small at 0.2 bcf/d that it doesn’t need all this permitting.

Very small projects like that don’t need the big permits, just some small ones.  This article is about the big LNG proposals, like Shell and Chevron and Petronas.

So with that in mind…what is the permitting process for a proposed liquefied natural gas export facility? What are the biggest challenges?

Step One: The National Energy Board (NEB)

The first hurdle – an export license from the federal National Energy Board – tests whether the project is in Canada’s economic best interests.

LNG proponents apply to the NEB to ship certain volumes of LNG annually for a set number of years. To grant an export license the board must find that the proposal is in the public interest and that the energy commodity to be exported is surplus to Canada’s energy needs.

Here the “best interest” question is only economic – the NEB is not charged with considering environmental impacts. Since the province – nay, the continent – is overflowing with natural gas and its export should generate all kinds of jobs and tax revenues, it’s little surprise that the board has approved every single LNG export license so far.

Three projects – Douglas Channel, Kitimat LNG, and LNG Canada – have already obtained NEB authorization. Three other applications are under review.

Step Two: Environmental Approval

The environmental assessment (EA) process is the longest and most complicated permitting step – and it carries the least certainty. To earn a green light projects have to meet the goals of environmental, economic, and social sustainability.

To that end, the EA process examines each project for anything that could be environmentally, economically or socially bad, and what heritage and health effects that may occur over the project’s entire life cycle.

That means talking to A LOT of people…

1.  Consulting with First Nations,

2.  Completing in-depth technical studies on potential significant adverse effects,

3.  Designing strategies to prevent or reduce those adverse effects, and then putting all the input and findings into a huge report that carries a recommendation to the Minister of the Environment and the Minister of Natural Gas on whether the project should be allowed – or not.

There’s a “Pre-Application Phase,” where the Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) decides if the project does indeed need EA approval and, if it does, how the approval process should work.

There is a lot of back-and-forth between the government and the company submitting the proposal—more technical data, engineering, proof of consultation, etc.

Once the full “Application Review Phase” starts, the EAO has 180 days to complete its review. That period includes a 45- to 60-day public comment period that includes open houses.

The EAO writes up a draft report that it shares with the proponent, the working group, and with First Nations, adding in any input. The final report includes a recommendation from the executive director of the EAO on whether an EA certificate should be issued and a draft EA certificate.

The draft certificate lists commitments the proponent made during the EA process to address concerns. It is not uncommon for an EA certificate to have more than 100 commitments – which are all legally binding if the certificate is signed.

It then goes to the government and the ministers have 45 days to make a decision. They can issue the EA certificate with the commitments listed, refuse to issue a certificate, or require further study.

Things have gotten easier on the EA front in recent years. In its recent budget the federal government handed almost all control of the EA process for energy projects to the provinces—before, they both did one. Sigh.

It’s a good move, but pipelines are still considered separate projects from the LNG facilities themselves, so that’s another entire EA approval process.

The First Nations Question

First Nations support is vital. Earning support for a LNG facility might not be too hard. Pipelines are a different story – and every facility needs one.

Anyone who wants to build a pipeline across northern BC likely has to consult with at least half a dozen First Nations, each with a different set of expectations and demands.

If you can find common ground, deals between project proponents and affected First Nations take the form of Impacts and Benefit Agreements. There are lots of examples – but the biggest challenge is that there still is no clear definition of what constitutes sufficient consultation, mitigation, and benefits. A poorly defined end game, to say the least.

Sometimes the road is smoother. The Haisla First Nation that occupies territory near Kitimat and at the head of the Douglas Channel is involved in three LNG proposals.

The Haisla are viewing this as an opportunity: they believe the deals that will flow from these LNG projects could give their people the ability to simply buy the lands they believe are theirs, without a treaty (and negotiations have been going on for years, if not decades).

More Permits

After this, work cannot start on the liquefaction plant until the project earns a facility permit from the BC Oil and Gas Commission. Then there are five different Acts that a facility must comply with—after the big EA approval has been won.

The process isn’t any more arduous than in other places, though it is a new ballgame with rules being made up on the fly. But BC offers advantages to would-be LNG exporters over other locales.

1.     The transport route from BC to Asia is only 9-10 days vs. 20-plus days for LNG ships out of the Gulf of Mexico.

2.     LNG is 30% more efficient in the cold weather of northwest BC vs. tropical areas.

3.     Canadian gas fields have liquids like ethane and butane, which add value by increasing the fuel’s energy density. A lot of US LNG has to add this in.

That’s great for would-be exporters…but on the flip side, the flood of interest raises some big picture questions for British Columbians and for the regulators charged with developing this brand new industry.

How many natural gas pipelines should be built across northern BC?

Is a fleet of independent facilities the best approach, or should proponents be required to rationalize some of their infrastructure?

How should the operations be powered? How much should they be taxed?

We are going to find out all these answers in the next two years.

by +Keith Schaefer

How To Invest in LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas: A 3-Step Strategy

0

How do investors play the LNG boom that is still in the early stages in Canada?

Many investors believe the opportunity is far off. After all, most of the projects are still in the application phase—it will be years before they get built and start selling cargos.

But National Bank energy analyst Greg Colman sees profits from LNG coming much sooner—right now, in fact.

He estimates there is $55 billion in capital coming into the Canadian LNG sector over the next few years…and the spending spree in western Canada is starting now.

And he laid it all out for investors in his 29-page research report on July 9, “Quantifying the LNG Impact.”

In order, he told investors:

  1. First buy the drillers and the frackers
  2. Then buy the companies that supply the camps for all the construction and full-time workers
  3. Then buy the haulers/lifters

Colman’s innovative research came from piecing together exactly what happened when similar LNG projects were developed in Australia.

His work points to a startling conclusion: LNG developers generally spend billions before a single survey peg is grounded on a new gas export facility.

To find out more about what’s happening, I sat down with Colman to ask exactly how investors can get in on the ground floor of this boom. He outlined his three-stage plan for grabbing a chunk of the profits from the massive ramp-up coming in LNG.

Below are some of the must-hear moments…

OGIB: Greg, in your report “Quantifying the LNG Impact,” you’ve studied a somewhat unusual place—Australia—to get an idea of what might happen in Canada as LNG production grows?

GC: Yes, we’re trying to point to Australia as an example of somebody that’s already done the LNG exporting. So it gives us a rough idea as to the pre-drilling time and the amount of pre-drilling volume you have to have.

OGIB: And you found that drilling activity actually begins long before LNG export facilities are commissioned?

GC: We came to the assumption that 200% of the export capacity has to be available at the time exporting commences. LNG facilities in Australia ranged between 137 and 268% of the export capacity. So we just took a midpoint there and said 200.

OGIB: So assuming you need to have 200% of your capacity already pumping at the time exports commence, how far in advance do you need to start development drilling?

GC: Generally what happened in Australia is you had about 4 to 5 years of time to pre-drill.

OGIB: That’s a lot of lead time.

GC: If you wait until the summer before you’re turning on your LNG facility to try to get 6 BCF of production drilled, you’re going to have to get every drilling rig in North America up into B.C. The cost would be astronomical.

OGIB: In your report, you forecast that LNG-related drilling is going to cost $55 billion over the next several years. How can investors bet on that massive influx of capital into the oil and gas services sector?

GC: I think the biggest near-term opportunity for investors is represented by the frackers, the drillers and the mobile accommodation providers that we typically refer to as the “camps.”

OGIB: You’ve discussed this as a sort of “three-stage” investing approach. What area should investors be looking at right now?

GC: I’m probably a little more biased towards the frackers. Stemming from two things. First, the fact that the frack intensity of gas plays tends to be significantly larger than the frack intensity from oil plays. Number two is that recently those companies have tended to be punished more from a share price perspective than the drillers.

OGIB: You’ve also mentioned some unique things about cost structures that might benefit frackers.

GC: The frackers have a much more fixed cost structure. This means their margins expand more when activity picks up.

OGIB: Can you explain that a little more? Frackers costs are more fixed than for the drillers?

GC: Yes. The drilling companies have much more variable costs in their structure versus the fracking companies. So as activity levels slow down their costs come down along with the activity level. Meaning you don’t get much margin compression.

OGIB: I see. Even when drillers are getting paid less during slow times, they still make similar margins because their costs drop. But that’s not true for the frackers?

GC: For the frackers with their largely-fixed costs, as activity levels start to pull back and pricing comes down you get much more margin compression than for drillers. The flip side is that when drilling picks up, fracking margins will expand more than for the drillers.

OGIB: How far away are we from these services companies seeing tangible benefits from the LNG boom?

GC: The huge uplift in demand for services is probably still one-and-a-half to two years out, again assuming these decisions are made to proceed with the facilities. But we are already seeing the initial demand, smaller but still meaningful in the very near term.

“Very near term” is a phrase I like to hear when it comes to profits. Especially in this case, because most of the market is assuming that LNG won’t have a material impact for years or even decades to come.

But with all the majors who’ve signed up for Canadian LNG—Chevron, Apache, Shell, BG, and most recently Malaysian major Petronas announcing it will invest $20 billion to develop its Pacific Northwest LNG project near Prince Rupert—we’re talking about a development almost unprecedented in our petroleum sector.

And once these firms start selling North American gas at $4/MMbtu to high-value markets like Japan and Korea at prices up to $15/MMbtu, a lot of profit is going to be made.

If Colman is right (and he makes a very compelling and well-researched argument), this could be one of the single most important events for the oil and gas services sector in the last 25 years.

Just the Top 6 projects (out of 12 now) suggest Canada could ship 13 billion cubic feet of LNG to Asia in 10 years—that’s as much as the entire country produces right now!

A $55 billion influx is a huge amount of money. Companies grabbing a piece of this pie are going to eat well.

by +Keith Schaefer

P.S.  Greg’s 3-step plan for investor profits in LNG makes great sense. In fact, with $55 billion in capital coming into the Canadian LNG sector over the next few years, now is the time for investors to get a leg up on their research, and position themselves for the biggest profits ahead. That’s why I put together my first-ever conference specifically focused on the LNG build-out. Click here to learn everything you need to know about my LNG Investment Conference. (It will sell out…we’re limiting attendance to the first 250 participants, so please don’t delay.)

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.